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Governance Factors Affecting Internal Auditors' Ethical Decision Making:  
An Exploratory Study 
 
Abstract: 
 
Purpose 
This paper explores the ethical decision making of internal auditors and the impact of 
corporate governance mechanisms thereon.  It also explores whether ethical decision 
making is influenced by years of experience in internal auditing. 
Design/methodology/approach 
Sixty-six internal auditors were presented with five ethical dilemmas. For each scenario, 
a key element of corporate governance was manipulated to assess its impact on ethical 
decision making. These were audit committee support; management integrity regarding 
accounting policies; management integrity regarding pressure on internal audit; external 
auditor characteristics; and organisational code of conduct.   
Findings 
Participants were generally sensitive to ethical dilemmas but were not always confident 
that their peers would act ethically. A higher quality external audit function was 
positively associated with internal auditors’ ethical decision making. However, the 
strength of other governance mechanisms did not appear to influence ethical decision 
making. Finally, more experienced internal auditors adopted a more ethical stance in 
some cases. 
Research limitations/implications 
Our sample was self-selected and may not be representative of internal auditors in 
general. Our lack of significant results may be due to insufficient variability in our 
manipulations and/or an oversimplification of reality in our scenarios.  
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Practical implications 
The study has implications for the internal audit profession with respect to training and 
the provision of support mechanisms to strengthen the ability of internal auditors to 
withstand pressure when dealing with ethical dilemmas. 
Originality/value 
This paper is the first to study whether the strength of other governance mechanisms 
influence internal auditors’ ethical decision making. 
 
Key Words: internal audit; ethics; corporate governance; external audit; years of 
experience. 
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Governance Factors Affecting Internal Auditors' Ethical Decision Making: An 
Exploratory Study 
 
Introduction 
 
 
The ethical standing of any profession is critical to its acceptance in society (Mintz, 
1995). Armstrong (1993, p.38) considers ethical conduct to lie “at the core of each 
profession’s reason for existence”. This is particularly so for the auditing profession 
where ethical failings can have far-reaching economic impacts and cause widespread 
financial distress.1 Procedures such as the issuing of the Code of Ethics for Professional 
Accountants (Accounting Professional and Ethical Standards Board (APESB, 2006), the 
setting up of disciplinary committees (Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia 
(ICAA) and CPA Australia, (ICAA, 2004), and the imposition of professional sanctions 
are steps the profession takes to encourage members to act, and be seen to act, in the 
public interest.  
 
A branch of the auditing profession that has strived for professional status in its own right 
is internal audit (Ridley, 2004).  Like other branches of the profession, The Institute of 
Internal Auditors (IIA) has a code of ethics which is designed to promote an ethical 
culture within internal auditing (IIA, 2000).  The code sets out the principles governing 
integrity, objectivity, confidentiality and competency, together with rules of conduct with 
respect to these principles.   
 
Ethical principles are particularly important for internal auditors for two reasons. First, 
internal auditors are frequently faced with ethical dilemmas which can challenge their 
standards (Larkin, 2000; Goodwin and Yeo, 2001; Thompson, 2003).  They may face 
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situations which require them to speak out (Barrier, 2003) and this is not always easy, 
particularly when pressure is being exerted by senior management to “go with the flow” 
and not to “make waves” (Thompson, 2003, p.72).  Second, with the current emphasis on 
corporate governance, it is becoming increasingly recognised that internal auditors can 
play a key role in strengthening business ethics and corporate integrity (Brown et al., 
2003; Jennings, 2003; Moeller, 2004).  As one of the cornerstones of corporate 
governance, internal auditors are expected to work with audit committees, boards and 
senior management to help set the right “tone at the top” and to help ensure that ethical 
behaviour flows down through the ranks to lower level employees (IIA, 2003; Brown et 
al., 2003; Bailey et al., 2003). 
 
Despite the critical importance of ethics to the internal audit function, little has been 
published in this area. Hence, the objectives of the present study are to explore internal 
auditors’ sensitivity to ethical dilemmas and to examine whether corporate governance 
mechanisms can in fact impact their ethical decision making.  We also examine whether 
the level of experience of internal auditors affects their ethical decisions.  Only a few 
studies have focused on the ethical decision making of internal auditors (Dittenhoffer and 
Klemm, 1983; Arnold and Ponemon, 1991; Dittenhoffer and Sennetti, 1994; Larkin, 
2000) and none of these examines the issues in the context of the new role of internal 
audit as a key corporate governance mechanism.   
 
We achieve the objectives of our study by presenting practising internal auditors with 
five ethical scenarios.  For each scenario, we manipulate the strength of a key element of 
corporate governance in a between-subjects design.  The manipulations include audit 
committee strength, two aspects of management integrity, commitment to a code of 
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conduct, and external audit characteristics. (Refer to Table I for a summary of these 
manipulations). Participants are asked to indicate (i) the likelihood that internal auditors 
would behave in a certain manner and (ii) their attitude as to how ethical or otherwise 
that behaviour would be.  These responses enable us to gauge whether the corporate 
governance mechanisms influence ethical decision making and whether the participants’ 
level of experience impacts these decisions.  Our findings suggest that only one corporate 
governance factor, namely the characteristics of the external audit function impact 
internal auditors’ ethical decision making. We do not obtain significant results for the 
other four corporate governance variables.  We also find that years of experience has 
some influence on internal auditors’ ethical decisions. 
 
Due to the sensitive nature of the study’s contents, and the possibility of self-selection 
bias resulting from the research method utilised (a survey instrument distributed at a 
conference), the results of the study cannot be described as definitive. However they 
provide preliminary evidence as to the impact - or lack thereof - of certain corporate 
governance factors on the ethical decisions of internal auditors, thereby demonstrating the 
need for further research into this important area for the internal audit profession. 
 
The present study makes two significant contributions. First, it explores internal auditors’ 
assessments of the likelihood of an internal auditor raising a contentious issue and also 
their attitude towards the action/inaction of their peers in such a situation. Second, the 
range of contextual factors utilised in this study are specifically associated with the new 
role of internal audit as part of a broader governance framework. As previously 
mentioned, as the internal audit function is now viewed as a key component of corporate 
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governance (studies such as Moeller, 2004) it is critical to evaluate internal audit ethical 
decision making in the context of modern corporate governance mechanisms.  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses prior 
literature and provides the background to the study.  The third section outlines the 
research method while the fourth section reports the results of the study.  The final 
section concludes by discussing the implications of the research findings, highlighting 
potential limitations and considering future areas for research.  
  
Background and Research Questions 
Prior Research on Accountants’ Ethical Decision Making 
 
A substantial body of literature has explored the ethical reasoning of accountants and 
external auditors, focusing on the impact of both individual and contextual factors (Jones 
et al., 2003). Individual factors examined include the level of ethical development2 
(Ponemon and Gabhart, 1993; Bernardi, 1994; Thorne, 2000), political orientation 
(Eynon et al., 1997), work experience (Bernardi, 1994; Thorne et al. 2003), 
organisational commitment (Patterson, 2001; Lord and DeZoort, 2001) and gender 
(Ponemon and Gabhart, 1993, Thorne and Magnan, 2000). Contextual factors include 
national culture (Cohen et al., 1995; Tsui, 1996; Goodwin et al. 2000), regulatory 
environment (Patterson, 2001; Thorne et al., 2003) and ethical intensity of a dilemma 
(Shafer et al., 2001).  Studies have also examined the ethical reasoning of accountancy 
students (Haswell and Jubb, 1995; Goodwin and Goodwin, 1999; O’Leary and Cotter, 
2000) and also compared students with practitioners (Lampe and Finn, 1992; Shaub, 
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1994). To a varying extent, these studies support the notion that both individual and 
contextual factors influence accountants’ and accounting students’ ethical judgments.  
 
In contrast, research into the ethical decision making of internal auditors is sparse. 
Dittenhoffer and Klemm (1983) evaluated internal auditors’ attitudes to twenty ethical 
issues, with the study being replicated ten years later by Dittenhoffer and Sennetti (1994). 
These researchers generally found an improvement in attitudes towards ethical issues 
over the ten year time period. Arnold and Ponemon (1991) examined internal auditors’ 
perceptions of whistle-blowing, using Rest’s (1979, 1994) DIT. They found that internal 
auditors with lower levels of moral reasoning were less likely to select whistle-blowing 
as a means of disclosing wrongdoing and this was particularly so when the whistle-
blower was likely to lose their job.  Larkin (2000) examined the effect of gender, age, 
years of employment and peer group influence on the ethical judgments of internal 
auditors working in a large financial services organisation.  He provided participants with 
six vignettes, three of which portrayed unethical behaviour and three portraying ethical 
behaviour.  The results of the study were mixed. There was no gender effect in four of the 
six vignettes. However, in one ethical scenario and one unethical scenario, there was 
evidence that females identified the appropriate behaviour better than their male 
counterparts. More experienced respondents identified unethical behaviour more clearly 
in two of the scenarios and believed that other internal auditors would make a similar 
assessment in all three scenarios describing unethical behaviour. However, there was no 
experience effect relating to the three vignettes describing ethical behaviour.  
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Corporate Governance  
The contextual factors included in the study relate to other key corporate governance 
mechanisms.  We manipulate the strength of the audit committee, the “tone at the top” set 
by senior management (as measured by (i) their attitude to accounting policy changes and 
(ii) pressurising internal audit), commitment to a code of conduct and the characteristics 
of the external audit firm.  The rationale for examining the impact of these factors on 
internal auditors’ ethical decision making lies in recent suggestions that corporate 
governance is comprised of four cornerstones: the audit committee, management, 
external audit and internal audit (IIA, 2003; Gramling et al., 2004; Adamec et al., 2005).  
Hence, we explore whether aspects of the other cornerstones of governance assist internal 
auditors to act ethically.   
 
The board of directors has been recognised as the key player in corporate governance by 
regulators and governance committees around the world (Cadbury Committee, 1992; 
United States (US) Congress, 2002; Australian Stock Exchange Corporate Governance 
Council, 2003).  As a sub-committee of the board, the audit committee, in particular, 
plays an important role in enhancing the quality of financial reporting (McMullen and 
Raghunandan, 1996; Davidson et al., 2005).  An effective audit committee should also 
strengthen the position of the internal audit function by providing an independent and 
supportive environment where the chief internal auditor (CIA) can raise matters affecting 
management (Braiotta, 1999; Goodwin and Yeo, 2001; Goodwin, 2004).   
 
Executive management plays a vital role in corporate governance by ensuring that the 
appropriate systems of internal control and risk management are in place (COSO, 1992; 
Adamec et al., 2005). However, according to Cynthia Cooper (the former vice-president 
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of Internal Audit at WorldCom Inc.), “it is the behavior of corporate leaders that has the 
greatest impact on an organization” (Barrier, 2003, p.54).  This is particularly so with 
respect to establishing a strong ethical environment.  While internal audit can assist 
management to instil a strong ethical tone throughout the organisation, a poor attitude by 
management can make it very difficult for the internal auditor to uphold ethical 
behaviour.  This is evidenced by the problems associated with whistle-blowing, 
particularly when the internal auditor’s job security or progress is threatened (Arnold and 
Ponemon, 1994).   
 
Both directors and management can further strengthen the ethical environment within the 
organisation by developing and enforcing a robust code of ethical conduct (Barrier, 2003; 
Brown et al., 2003; Adamec et al., 2005).  Research evidence suggests that corporate 
codes of ethics, accompanied by training and monitoring programs, have an impact on 
employee behaviour (Pickard, 1995). The Working Group on Corporate Practices and 
Conduct (1993) in Australia argues that a code of ethical conduct should help to maintain 
high standards of behaviour throughout the organisation.  To be effective, however, the 
code must be communicated throughout the organisation and enforced by management 
(Brooks, 1992; McNamee, 1992; Goodwin and Seow, 2000).  
 
External audit is also regarded as an important cornerstone of corporate governance, 
particularly with respect to the prevention and detection of fraud and errors in financial 
statements (Adamec et al., 2005; Davidson et al., 2005).  External auditors play a 
valuable monitoring role in improving the credibility of financial reporting (Schelluch et 
al., 2004). The performance of a quality audit, however, is dependent on both the 
independence of the external auditor and on the nature and extent of the work undertaken 
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(DeAngelo, 1981). The external auditor can rely on the work of internal audit provided 
certain conditions are met concerning the status, competency and scope of work of the 
internal audit function (IFAC 2004). In working together, the relationship between 
internal and external auditors should be one of mutual support and cooperation in order to 
strengthen overall audit quality (Green, 2003; Gramling and Myers, 2003).    
Years of Experience 
 
As noted, a number of prior studies have found that experience impacts on the ethical 
decision making of accountants and auditors.  However, the direction of the relationship 
is ambiguous. In an experiment on working paper review, Bernardi (1994) found that 
managers outperformed seniors with respect to identifying ethical cues.  Bernardi and 
Arnold (1997) found a positive association between years of work experience and moral 
development (measured by DIT scores), but only for female accountants.  In contrast, 
Shaub (1994) reported a negative association between DIT scores and years of work 
experience.  Ponemon and Gabhart (1993) obtained conflicting results between Canadian 
and US accountants.  Years of experience were negatively related to DIT scores for US 
accountants but positively related with DIT scores for Canadian accountants.  The 
findings of this study contrast with those of Thorne et al. (2003) who found a significant 
negative association between years of experience and DIT scores for both US and 
Canadian accountants.   
 
As previously discussed, the only study to examine the effect of experience on internal 
auditors’ ethical decision making found some evidence that more experienced internal 
auditors identify unethical behaviour more clearly than their less experienced 
counterparts (Larkin, 2000).  However, Larkin’s results relate to internal auditors from a 
single financial institution in the United States, with two thirds of respondents having no 
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more than five years experience   Hence, a further examination of the effect of experience 
on internal auditors’ ethical decision making is justified to assess whether Larkin’s 
findings are generalisable to a broader group of internal auditors.  
 
 
Research Questions 
 
The above discussions lead to the following research questions (RQ): 
RQ1:  To what extent do other corporate governance mechanisms affect internal auditors’ 
ethical judgments? 
RQ2: To what extent does experience in internal auditing affect internal auditors’ ethical 
judgments? 
 
 
Research Method 
 
Sample and Procedures 
The study was conducted as a field experiment. In March 2005, approximately 400 
experienced internal auditors attended the SOPAC conference, the annual conference of 
the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) Australia, in Brisbane, Australia. They came from 
approximately six countries, predominantly Australia. With the support of the IIA, a 
survey instrument (discussed below) was distributed to approximately 250 of the 
delegates at the conference. Delegates were to return completed copies to the reception 
desk at the end of the conference or they could take the survey instrument away with 
them and complete it later. They were provided with a reply paid envelope to return the 
completed survey instruments to the researchers. A letter indicating the support of the IIA 
accompanied all copies of the survey instrument. A total of 66 completed surveys were 
returned to the researchers, representing a response rate of 26%.3 
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Research Instrument 
The research instrument comprised an introductory letter indicating the support of the 
IIA, a brief summary of the research together with instructions, five ethical dilemmas 
each followed by two questions (see Appendix 1 for an example of one of the dilemmas 
and questions thereon), and a section concerning the background of the respondent.  
Background questions related to experience, gender, sector worked and nationality.   
 
The two questions asked after each dilemma were based on prior ethical studies in 
accounting and auditing.  The first question asked the respondent to assess the likelihood 
that the internal auditor in the scenario would act in a certain manner.  A nine-point scale 
(ranging from 1 to 9) was provided with the endpoints marked as ‘highly unlikely’ and 
‘highly likely’ respectively. The second question asked respondents to assume that the 
internal auditor had not taken the action suggested and to indicate their attitude as to how 
unethical or ethical they perceived the lack of action to be.  Again, a nine-point scale was 
used, with the endpoints marked as ‘extremely unethical’ and ‘extremely ethical’ 
respectively. Following Ponemon and Gabhart (1993) and Arnold and Ponemon (1991), 
we developed scenarios in the third person rather than asking what the respondent would 
do. These authors suggest that, because of the sensitive nature of ethical issues, framing 
the questions in this manner provides a reliable measure of what the respondent actually 
believes. 
 
Two versions of each dilemma were developed, manipulating the background 
information of each scenario to capture the impact of other corporate governance 
mechanisms on internal auditors’ ethical decision making. As noted, these are the 
strength of the audit committee, management integrity (as evidenced by changes to 
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accounting policies), management integrity (as evidenced by pressure exerted on the 
internal auditor), commitment to a code of ethical conduct, and characteristics of the 
external audit firm. Each factor was manipulated at two levels, stronger or weaker4, as 
shown in Table I. Version One of the research instrument had two of the factors set at a 
strong level and three at a weak level (Scenarios One and Three were strong and 
Scenarios Two, Four and Five were weak). Version Two had three strong factors and two 
weak factors (Scenarios Two, Four and Five were strong, while Scenarios One and Three 
were weak).  Hence, the strengths of the five scenarios were varied within each version of 
the research instrument. This was to avoid the respondents falling into a “pattern effect” 
due to reviewing all “good case” or “bad case” scenarios. A pilot study involving four 
experienced auditors resulted in a satisfactory assessment of both versions of the survey 
instrument, prior to its distribution for the actual study. In particular, the pilot study 
confirmed the strength of the manipulations as strong or weak.5 
 
TAKE IN TABLE I  
 
Results 
 
 
The 66 responses received were analysed using the SPSS software package.  As the two 
versions of the research instrument had been issued randomly, this resulted in 32 useable 
responses to version 1 and 34 useable responses to version 2.   
 
A summary of the biographical data for the respondents is given in Table II.  The table 
shows that 88% of respondents were male and 85% were from Australia. These 
distributions mean that we could not meaningfully test for gender or country effects. 
However, tests indicated that the omission of the females and non-Australians from the 
sample does not materially impact our results.  Table II also shows that 71% of 
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respondents work in the private sector and 29% in the public sector.  We tested for the 
possibility of sector differences, with the results providing no evidence that the sector in 
which internal auditors work influences their ethical decision making.6  
 
TAKE IN TABLE II  
 
It can also be seen from Table II that only 20% of respondents have less than five years 
experience in internal auditing, while 23% have twenty years or more experience. For the 
purposes of testing for an experience effect, we collapse this variable into two categories 
using a ten year cut-off point.  This cut-off provides 27 (41%) respondents in the less 
experienced group and 39 (59%) in the more experienced group.7 
 
Tables III to VII report the results of analyses of variance for each of the corporate 
governance manipulations, together with the experience effect.  For each table, Panel A 
reports descriptive statistics (means, standard deviations and cell sizes), while Panel B 
reports the analysis of variance results.   
 
TAKE IN TABLES III TO VII 
 
Overall, the descriptive statistics reported in these tables suggest a relatively high level of 
ethical awareness by respondents.  Recall that the second question asked the respondent 
to assume that the internal auditor in the scenario did not raise or report an issue.  They 
were then asked their attitude as to how ethical this lack of action would be by marking a 
point on a 9-point scale, where 1 represents “extremely unethical” and 9 represents 
“extremely ethical”.  These results are reported in the columns headed “Ethical 
assessment”.   Across all the scenarios, the overall means range from a low of 2.42 for 
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scenario 4 to a high of 3.35 for scenario 1, well below the mid-point of 5 on the scale. 
Thus, in general, respondents appear to be reasonably sensitive to unethical behaviour.   
 
However, they are less convinced that the internal auditors in the scenarios would 
actually behave in an ethical manner. Again, recall that the first question asked 
respondents to indicate the likelihood that the internal auditor would raise or report the 
issue.  Using a 9-point scale where 1 represents “highly unlikely” and 9 represents 
“highly likely”, the mid-point of 5 would suggest a neutral position. Overall means across 
the five scenarios for this likelihood judgment are relatively close to the mid-point, 
ranging from a low of 5.06 for scenario 5 to a high of 6.17 for scenario 4.   
 
Scenario 1 involves the chief internal auditor (CIA) raising a material revenue 
recognition issue with the audit committee when being pressured not to do so by the 
financial controller.  The strength of the audit committee is manipulated (Table 1) as 
stronger or weaker. Panel A of Table III indicates that the cell means for question 1 
(likelihood judgment) range from 5.07 to 5.53, implying that respondents are not strongly 
convinced that the CIA would report to the audit committee.  The means for question 2 
(attitude towards ethical assessment) range from 3.16 to 3.60, suggesting that a failure to 
report the issue, while unethical, is not considered to be extremely so.   Panel B of Table 
III indicates that neither the audit committee manipulation nor level of experience 
influences the responses to questions 1 and 2.  This suggests that internal auditors, 
regardless of their level of experience, would not be influenced by the strength of the 
audit committee when deciding whether to report to the committee.   
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Scenario 2 concerns the CIA of a government department raising an accounting policy 
change with the Minister at the annual accounts review.  Management’s attitude to 
changing accounting policies is manipulated as a consistent application of policies or 
frequent changes to policies, reflecting their level of integrity in this regard.  Panel A of 
Table IV shows that the means for the likelihood judgment generally exceed 6.0, 
suggesting a relatively high expectation that the CIA would raise the issue with the 
Minister.  The means for the ethical assessment are broadly similar to those in the first 
scenario. Again, Panel B shows that neither of the independent variables significantly 
influences these judgments. 
 
Scenario 3 relates to the CIA raising a possible environmental liability with the external 
auditors.  Management integrity is manipulated as weaker or stronger by reference to the 
application of pressure on the CIA by the chief executive officer (CEO) in the weaker 
case, with no such pressure in the stronger case.  Panel A of Table V suggests that 
respondents are sensitive to the unethical behaviour in this case, with all of the means for 
the ethical assessment being less than 3.0.  The means for the likelihood judgment are 
lower for less experienced respondents compared to more experienced respondents and 
Panel B indicates that this difference is statistically significant (p = .006).  More 
experienced internal auditors are more convinced that the CIA in the scenario would act 
ethically than are their less experienced counterparts.  
 
Scenario 4 involves the CIA of a city council reporting management fraud to the council 
and recommending prosecution. Mitigating circumstances are that the manager involved 
admits that he stole council assets to fund medical expenses for a sick child and that he 
has started to make full recompense for his thefts.  He has also resigned from the council.  
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The strength of the council’s code of ethical conduct is manipulated so that, on the one 
hand, a detailed code exists, listing specific ethical issues and appropriate actions while, 
on the other hand, a very general and vaguer code is in place. Table VI (Panel B) 
indicates that differences in the code of conduct do not appear to influence responses. 
However, there are significant experience effects for both the likelihood judgment (p = 
.000) and the ethical assessment (p = .015).  Panel A shows that more experienced 
internal auditors expect the CIA to report to Council and to recommend prosecution 
while less experienced respondents are less convinced that such action would be taken.  
While both groups assess a lack of action to be unethical, the more experienced 
respondents’ scores are closer to the end-point of “extremely unethical”. 
 
Scenario 5 concerns reporting the possibility of management fraud to the financial 
controller and external auditor. In this case, the internal auditor is standing in for the CIA 
at a meeting with these parties.  External audit characteristics are manipulated to reflect a 
higher level of independence and commitment to quality on the one hand, and a less 
independent, lower quality firm on the other.   The results are reported in Table VII. 
Panel B reports a significant external auditor effect for both the likelihood judgment and 
the ethical assessment (p = .023 and p = .027 respectively).  Panel A shows that 
respondents in the more independent/higher quality auditor treatment believe that the 
internal auditor is more likely to raise the issue of concern at the meeting compared to 
those in the less independent/lower quality treatment.  The more independent/high quality 
group also assesses a lack of action to be more unethical than does the less 
independent/lower quality group.  There is also a weakly significant experience effect 
with respect to the ethical assessment (p = .056), with more experienced respondents 
assessing a lack of action to be more unethical than the less experienced respondents.  
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Overall, as far as RQ1 is concerned, it appears that four of five corporate governance 
mechanisms have a minimum effect on the ethical opinions of internal auditors. The 
exception appears to be external auditor independence and quality. Internal auditors are 
more likely to raise issues with the financial controller and the external auditor, and 
consider a failure to do so as more unethical, when the external audit firm is of higher 
quality and more independent.   With regard to RQ2, results indicate that there are some 
differences in ethical opinions based on years of experience. More experienced internal 
auditors considered a greater likelihood of adopting a more ethical stance existed in two 
of five scenarios and they also considered inaction to be more unethical in two of five 
scenarios. This finding is broadly consistent with that of Larkin (2000). 
 
Concluding Comments 
 
The objectives of this study were to evaluate internal auditors’ ethical decision making 
and to examine the impact of corporate governance mechanisms and the effect of 
experience thereon.  We found that internal auditors as a group demonstrate a reasonably 
high sensitivity to ethical issues. This was assessed by evaluating their attitude towards 
internal auditors’ inactions when faced with ethical dilemmas. However, when assessing 
the likelihood of internal auditors taking appropriate action when faced with ethical 
dilemmas, evidence exists that they are not always convinced their peers would behave in 
an ethical manner. One factor influencing this perception is the fact that key corporate 
governance mechanisms appear to have little impact upon internal auditors’ ability to act 
ethically, when presented with a workplace dilemma. Given five corporate governance 
support factors, internal auditors only appear to regard the strength of the external audit 
function as having a positive effect on ethical decision making. The existence of an 
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effective audit committee, a strong organisational code of conduct and high management 
integrity do not appear to assist internal auditors to act more ethically when faced with a 
dilemma.   
 
We also found some significant experience effects in three of the five scenarios. More 
experienced internal auditors expected the adoption of a more ethical stance than less 
experienced auditors in some instances. Similarly they also occasionally assessed 
inaction as more unethical.  Given that our more experienced auditors had ten or more 
years of experience, these findings could indicate a maturity factor, reflecting the views 
of those in an older age bracket.  
 
The results of our study have implications for the internal audit profession with respect to 
training and the provision of support mechanisms to strengthen the ability of the internal 
auditor to withstand pressure when faced with ethical dilemmas.  If internal audit is to be 
considered a critical component of corporate governance, then it is important that 
practitioners in the area have strong support when making ethical decisions. However, 
exactly which component(s) of corporate governance provide the most meaningful 
support appears in need of further evaluation. This study’s non-significant results 
regarding the lack of impact of some corporate governance mechanisms tentatively 
suggests that they may not be as relevant to internal auditors’ ethical decision making as 
might be expected.   
 
There are a number of limitations to our study, all of which provide opportunities for 
further research.  First, our sample was a self-selected sample drawn from internal 
auditors attending a conference. Given that those attending the conference are likely to be 
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highly motivated members of their profession, and that those responding to the survey are 
likely to be those with an interest in ethical issues, the sample may not be representative 
of internal auditors in general.  Second, the sample comprises mainly Australian males 
and thus we are unable to explore the possibility of both gender and country differences 
in ethical decision making.  Third, our failure to find significant corporate governance 
effects in four of the five scenarios may be due to insufficient variability in our 
manipulations, given the between-subjects design.  While pilot testing indicated that our 
manipulations were appropriate, the lack of manipulation checks in our instrument means 
that we cannot be certain that respondents interpreted the scenarios in the manner 
intended. For example, those in the weak audit committee treatment group may still have 
perceived the audit committee to offer some protection to the internal auditor.  Similarly, 
the weaker code of conduct treatment may have been perceived as offering some 
guidance to the internal auditor.  Fourth, as with all studies of this nature, the scenarios 
we present inevitably oversimplify the reality of an ethical dilemma faced by internal 
auditors. In particular, each governance mechanism we manipulate is examined in 
isolation from the other mechanisms that may also have an impact on an internal 
auditor’s ethical decision making. This design was necessary in order to avoid the 
likelihood of complex interaction effects that would be extremely difficult to interpret. 
Further, such a design would either require a much greater number of participants or 
would necessitate a within-subjects study, leading to possible response bias problems.   
 
Despite the acknowledged limitations of this research, both the significant results relating 
to the external audit function and the non-significant results relating to the other 
governance mechanisms are considered useful findings and provide many opportunities 
for further research.  Indeed, the non-significant results tend to suggest more research is 
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urgently needed in this area.  Further exploration of the experience effect is also 
warranted in order to assess the influence of maturity or seniority on ethical decision 
making.   
 
Given the exploratory nature of our study, there are numerous avenues for future research 
in addition to those already noted. The impact of other mechanisms such as board 
independence, CEO/board chair duality, risk management procedures and whistle-
blowing policies could also be explored.  Further, the combined impact of the various 
governance elements could be explored to assess whether the overall strength of a 
corporate governance system influences internal auditor ethical decision making. Finally, 
studies could incorporate other contextual and individual factors such as national culture, 
organisational culture, level of moral development, organisational commitment and 
gender.   
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Appendix 1 – Example Ethical Scenario and Questions from the Research 
Instrument 
 
 
Scenario 1  
 
Tom is in his first year as chief internal auditor for Refrigerators Ltd. reporting directly to 
the CEO. Management’s new sales policy of selling refrigerators to clients and extending 
the normal one year warranty to two, on payment of an extra $300 at time of purchase, 
has proved very successful. This has a material effect on the turnover figure. Sales have 
increased 30%. Tom notes however that the total revenue is being recognised in the first 
year instead of deferring the $300 to the second year. Tom wishes to raise the issue for 
discussion with the audit committee, whom he meets with every quarter. The financial 
controller disagrees and says, “It’s a done deal” and that the CEO wants it to remain that 
way. Once they sign up, she explains, they’re effectively tied in so we can recognise the 
total revenue immediately. She is an executive director and stresses to Tom she does not 
want the matter raised with the audit committee, as it’s frivolous. She also stresses Tom’s 
first year performance review with the CEO is to be undertaken shortly. 
 
Refrigerators Ltd.’s new audit committee meets quarterly. It is comprised of one former 
auditor, now a non-executive director and two other non-executive directors both of 
whom have significant accounting experience. The audit committee’s new charter states 
they are to actively review compliance with significant accounting standards. The audit 
committee reports to the full board after each meeting. 
 
 
What do you think would be the likelihood of Tom raising the issue of revenue 
recognition with the Audit Committee at his next meeting: 
 
Highly Unlikely      Highly Likely 
 
__________________________________________________ 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
 
Now assume that Tom does not raise the issue with the board at his next meeting. 
Please indicate the extent to which you believe that Tom's action is ethical or 
unethical: 
 
Extremely Unethical      Extremely Ethical 
 
___________________________________________________ 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
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Endnotes
                                                 
1 As evidenced, for example, by the collapse of companies such as Enron, Sunbeam and WorldCom in the 
United States and HIH, Harris Scarfe and One-Tel in Australia. 
2 Most of these studies use Rest’s (1979 and 1994) defining issues test (DIT) to measure accountants’ level 
of moral development. 
3 As the distribution was at various sessions of the conference, participants who took the survey instrument 
could not be identified for subsequent follow up. Also, given the nature of the distribution a response rate 
of 26% was considered adequate. Apart from the IIA covering letter there was no other way of encouraging 
additional responses. There was no reason to suspect that non-respondents would have differed from 
respondents, as all were random delegates at an internal audit conference. However a possibility of non-
response bias, self-selection bias, or bias due to the small sample size must be recognised as possible 
limitations of the study. 
4 The terms “stronger” and “weaker” only have meaning relative to each other. 
5 We did not include manipulation checks in our instrument in order to avoid the likelihood of response 
bias resulting from alerting participants to the factor being explored. This means that we cannot be certain 
that participants interpreted our scenarios in the way we intended and this is noted as a limitation of the 
study. 
6 ANOVA tests – comparisons of mean responses - for public and private sector auditors were performed 
and revealed no significant differences.  
7 While nine years experience may appear to be extensive, recall the discussion from the background and 
research questions section.  It was shown there that previous studies regarding years of experience have 
revealed ambiguous results. Hence, it was decided for this study to be conservative in our estimate of 
experience and so it was set at a sufficiently long time span. It should be noted that our differentiation is 
based on “less experienced” compared to “more experienced” and we do not assert that the “less 
experienced” group is inexperienced.    
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TABLE I 
Ethical Dilemma and Manipulation of Corporate Governance Factors 
Dilemma Factor Strong/Good Weak/Poor 
- CIA of company  
- Raising material 
accounting issue with 
audit committee 
- Recognising revenue 
ahead of time 
- CIA pressured by 
financial controller (an 
executive director) not 
to raise with audit 
committee 
Audit 
Committee  
 
- Meets quarterly and reports 
to Board quarterly. 
- All non-executive directors, 
all with accounting expertise. 
 
- Organisation’s charter 
empowers Audit Committee 
(AC) to actively ‘review and 
pursue’. 
- Meets half-yearly and 
reports to Board annually. 
- All non-executive directors 
but only one with accounting 
expertise. 
- Organisation’s charter only 
empowers AC to review 
overall results and annual 
report. 
- CIA of Government 
department 
-Raising material 
accounting policy 
change with Minister at 
annual accounts review  
- Change in depreciation 
rate by joint-venture 
entity  
- Financial officer 
refuses to provide 
supporting evidence  
Management 
Integrity 
(evidenced 
by changes to 
accounting 
policies) 
- Accounting policies applied 
consistently from period to 
period.  
- Few changes, all thoroughly 
explained with a clear 
demonstration of profit effect. 
- Accounting policies 
changed on a surprisingly 
regular basis. 
- All changes are 
appropriately disclosed but 
information and explanations 
are at a minimum. 
- CIA of company 
- Raising possible 
contingent liability 
(environmental liability) 
with external auditors 
 
Management 
Integrity 
(evidenced 
by 
pressurising 
Internal 
Audit) 
 - Diversified Board  
- CEO (executive director) 
less powerful 
-CEO does not apply pressure 
to CIA 
- Board dominated by one 
family  
- CEO (executive director) 
more powerful (family 
member) 
- CEO applies pressure to 
CIA   
- CIA of city council 
- Reporting fraud to 
council, recommending 
prosecution 
-Theft of assets by 
manager to pay for 
medical expenses of 
sick child 
- Manager resigns and 
starts to make full 
recompense  
Code of  
Conduct 
- Organisation’s Accounting 
and Procedural Arrangements 
Manual, includes a detailed 
“Code of Conduct”. 
- Specifically lists several 
ethical issues and the actions 
to be taken. 
- Organisation’s Accounting 
and Procedural 
Arrangements Manual, 
includes a very general “Code 
of Conduct”. 
- Does not specifically list 
ethical issues. Vague as 
regards actions to be taken. 
- IA of company 
- Raising an unusual 
expense that suggests 
management fraud with 
financial controller  
(FC) and external 
auditor (EA) 
- IA has to stand in for 
CIA at meeting with FC 
(board member, son of 
company founder) and 
EA 
External 
Auditors 
- Respected second tier firm.  
- Second year as auditors and 
the board respects them. 
- Threatened to resign last year 
unless certain matters were 
disclosed in the final accounts. 
- Small suburban firm.  
- Long association with 
board, board treats them as a 
friend. 
- Once accounts are lodged 
on time and all appears 
reasonable, they are satisfied. 
CIA = chief internal auditor; IA = internal auditor; CEO = chief executive officer 
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TABLE II 
Details of Respondents 
 No. % 
Gender:   
   Male 58 88 
   Female 8 12 
Sector working in:   
   Public 47 71 
   Private 19 29 
Country   
   Australia 56 85 
   New Zealand 8 12 
   Other 2 3 
Years of internal auditing 
experience: 
  
   Less than 2 years 5 8 
   2-5 years 8 12 
   5-10 years 14 21 
   10 - 20 years 24 36 
   20 years or more 15 23 
 
TABLE III 
Scenario 1 – Strength of Audit Committee 
Panel A: Means (standard deviations) and cell sizes 
 Less than 10 years 10 years and more Overall 
 Likelihood 
of ethical 
action 
Ethical 
assessment 
Likelihood 
of ethical 
action 
Ethical 
assessment 
Likelihood 
of ethical 
action 
Ethical 
assessment 
Stronger audit 
committee 
5.50 
(1.73) 
3.17 
(1.11) 
5.30 
(2.41) 
3.45 
(2.11) 
5.38 
(2.15) 
3.34 
(1.79) 
 n = 12 n = 20 n = 32 
Weaker audit 
committee 
5.07 
(2.22) 
3.60 
(2.50) 
5.53 
(2.17) 
3.16 
(1.07) 
5.32 
(2.17) 
3.35 
(1.82) 
 n = 15 n = 19 n = 34 
Overall 5.26 
(1.99) 
3.41 
(1.99) 
5.41 
(2.27) 
3.31 
(1.67) 
5.35 
(2.14) 
3.35 
(1.79) 
 n = 27 n = 39 n = 66 
Panel B: Analysis of Variance 
Source of variation Mean Square F Sig. of F 
 Likelihood 
of ethical 
action 
Ethical 
assessment 
Likelihood 
of ethical 
action 
Ethical 
assessment 
Likelihood 
of ethical 
action 
Ethical 
assessment 
Audit committee   .170   .079 .035 .024 .851 .878 
Years of experience   .267   .100 .056 .030 .814 .863 
Interaction 1.722 2.083 .360 .625 .551 .432 
Likelihood of action: 1 = highly unlikely; 9 = highly likely 
Ethical assessment: 1 = extremely unethical; 9 = extremely ethical 
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TABLE IV 
Scenario 2 – Management Integrity (Consistency of accounting policies) 
Panel A: Means (standard deviations) and cell sizes 
 Less than 10 years 10 years and more Overall 
 Likelihood 
of ethical 
action 
Ethical 
assessment 
Likelihood 
of ethical 
action 
Ethical 
assessment 
Likelihood 
of ethical 
action 
Ethical 
assessment 
6.40 
(2.41) 
3.53 
(2.47) 
6.32 
(2.19) 
3.26 
(1.88) 
6.35 
(2.25) 
3.38 
(2.13) 
Good management 
attitude to changing 
accounting policies n = 15 n = 19 n = 34 
5.75 
(1.91) 
2.75 
(1.36) 
6.00 
(2.51) 
3.35 
(2.21) 
5.91 
(2.27) 
3.13 
(1.88) 
Poor management 
attitude to changing 
accounting policies n = 12 n = 20 n = 32 
Overall 6.11 
(2.19) 
3.19 
(2.06) 
6.15 
(2.33) 
3.31 
(2.03) 
6.14 
(2.26) 
3.26 
(2.03) 
 n = 27 n = 39 n = 66 
Panel B: Analysis of Variance 
Source of variation Mean Square F Sig. of F 
 Likelihood 
of ethical 
action 
Ethical 
assessment 
Likelihood 
of ethical 
action 
Ethical 
assessment 
Likelihood 
of ethical 
action 
Ethical 
assessment 
Management attitude 3.692 1.920 .698 .454 .407 .503 
Years of experience   .109   .431 .021 .102 .886 .751 
Interaction   .442 2.997 .084 .709 .773 .403 
Likelihood of action: 1 = highly unlikely; 9 = highly likely 
Ethical assessment: 1 = extremely unethical; 9 = extremely ethical 
 
TABLE V 
Scenario 3 – Management Integrity (Pressure exerted on Internal Auditor) 
Panel A: Means (standard deviations) and cell sizes 
 Less than 10 years 10 years and more Overall 
 Likelihood 
of ethical 
action 
Ethical 
assessment 
Likelihood 
of ethical 
action 
Ethical 
assessment 
Likelihood 
of ethical 
action 
Ethical 
assessment 
No pressure exerted 4.73 
(2.09) 
2.60 
(1.40) 
6.21 
(1.72) 
2.26 
(1.24) 
5.56 
(2.00) 
2.41 
(1.31 
 n = 15 n = 19 n = 34 
Pressure exerted 5.00 
(1.95) 
2.67 
(1.30) 
6.20 
(1.79) 
2.85 
(1.81) 
5.75 
(1.92) 
2.78 
(1.62) 
 n = 12 n = 20 n = 32 
Overall 4.85 
(1.99) 
2.63 
(1.33) 
6.21 
(1.73) 
2.56 
(1.57) 
5.65 
(1.95) 
2.59 
(1.47) 
 n = 27 n = 39 n = 66 
Panel B: Analysis of Variance 
Source of variation Mean Square F Sig. of F 
 Likelihood 
of ethical 
action 
Ethical 
assessment 
Likelihood 
of ethical 
action 
Ethical 
assessment 
Likelihood 
of ethical 
action 
Ethical 
assessment 
Pressure     .260 1.691   .074 .768 .786 .384 
Years of experience 28.371   .093 8.095 .042 .006 .838 
Interaction    .304 1.071   .087 .486 .769 .488 
Likelihood of action: 1 = highly unlikely; 9 = highly likely 
Ethical assessment: 1 = extremely unethical; 9 = extremely ethical 
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TABLE VI 
Scenario 4 – Code of Ethical Conduct 
Panel A: Means (standard deviations) and cell sizes 
 Less than 10 years 10 years and more Overall 
 Likelihood 
of ethical 
action 
Ethical 
assessment 
Likelihood 
of ethical 
action 
Ethical 
assessment 
Likelihood 
of ethical 
action 
Ethical 
assessment 
Stronger code of 
conduct 
5.20 
(2.43) 
2.87 
(1.79) 
7.00 
(2.13) 
1.79 
(0.63) 
6.21 
(2.10 
2.26 
(1.33) 
 n = 15 n = 19 n = 34 
Weaker code of 
conduct 
4.67 
(2.39) 
3.25 
(2.45) 
7.00 
(1.41) 
2.20 
(1.79) 
6.13 
(2.47) 
2.59 
(2.09 
 n = 12 n = 20 n = 32 
Overall 4.96 
(2.38) 
3.04 
(2.05) 
7.00 
(1.79) 
2.00 
(1.36) 
6.17 
(2.27) 
2.42 
(1.74) 
 n = 27 n = 39 n = 66 
Panel B: Analysis of Variance 
Source of variation Mean Square F Sig. of F 
 Likelihood 
of ethical 
action 
Ethical 
assessment 
Likelihood 
of ethical 
action 
Ethical 
assessment 
Likelihood 
of ethical 
action 
Ethical 
assessment 
Code of conduct   1.126  2.495     .261   .877 .611 .353 
Years of experience 67.626 17.911 15.399 6.297 .000 .015 
Interaction   1.126     .003     .261   .001 .611 .975 
Likelihood of action: 1 = highly unlikely; 9 = highly likely 
Ethical assessment: 1 = extremely unethical; 9 = extremely ethical 
 
TABLE VII 
Scenario 5 –External Audit Characteristics 
Panel A: Means (standard deviations) and cell sizes 
 Less than 10 years 10 years and more Overall 
 Likelihood 
of ethical 
action 
Ethical 
assessment 
Likelihood 
of ethical 
action 
Ethical 
assessment 
Likelihood 
of ethical 
action 
Ethical 
assessment 
More independent 
external auditor 
5.25 
(2.30) 
3.08 
(2.23) 
6.15 
(2.60) 
1.75 
(0.79) 
5.81 
(2.49) 
2.25 
(1.61) 
 n = 12 n = 20 n = 32 
Less independent 
external auditor 
4.40 
(2.41) 
3.47 
(2.10) 
4.32 
(1.80) 
3.21 
(1.40) 
4.35 
(2.06) 
3.32 
(1.72) 
 n = 15 n = 19 n = 34 
Overall 4.78 
(2.36) 
3.30 
(2.13) 
5.26 
(2.40) 
2.46 
(1.33) 
5.06 
(2.38) 
2.80 
(1.74) 
 n = 27 n = 39 n = 66 
Panel B: Analysis of Variance 
Source of variation Mean Square F Sig. of F 
 Likelihood 
of ethical 
action 
Ethical 
assessment 
Likelihood 
of ethical 
action 
Ethical 
assessment 
Likelihood 
of ethical 
action 
Ethical 
assessment 
External auditor 28.520 13.458 5.416 5.101 .023 .027 
Years of experience   2.634 10.000   .500 3.791 .482 .056 
Interaction    3.834   4.593   .728 1.741 .397 .192 
Likelihood of action: 1 = highly unlikely; 9 = highly likely 
Ethical assessment: 1 = extremely unethical; 9 = extremely ethical 
